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ARENAS AND STADIUMS 
Do they make 
economic sense? 
by JOHN G. FOY, JR. / Partner, Detroit 
Cities struggling to spur growth, 
boost civic pride, and increase 
revenue have turned to a variety of 
capital projects —shopping malls, 
arts centers, new government build-
ings, and, importantly, sports arenas. 
The recent boom-bust cycle of 
sports center development is an 
excellent object lesson in this time of 
governmental budget crunches. It 
suggests the complexity of problems 
to be addressed if expectations are to 
be fulfilled. 
In 1972, Denver voters turned down 
legislation to finance the 1976 
Winter Olympics in their city; the 
Games were moved to Innsbruck, 
Still a topic of discussion is the 
cost of capital construction for the 
1 9 7 6 S u m m e r O l y m p i c s in 
Montreal —not only in the economic 
and political circles of that city, but 
also in any other city mentioned as a 
site for future Games. 
After lengthy negotiations be-
tween the City of Los Angeles and 
the International Olympic Commit-
tee, it appears that an agreement has 
been reached that will protect Los 
Angeles taxpayers in the event the 
1984 Games in that city suffer a loss. 
Despite the popularity, despite 
the glamorous image of the sports 
world, its colorful impresarios no 
longer seem so able to persuade 
Amer ican taxpayers and loca l 
officials to spend tax dollars for an 
arena or stadium whose construc-
tion is against their better financial 
judgment. An era of uninhibited 
expansion in professional sports, of 
new stadiums and arenas built with 
civic pride and civic ambition ap-
pears to have wound down. 
Whether or not to spend public 
money to construct an arena or 
stadium now prompts a vigorous 
community discussion. What are the 
precise benefits, what are the finan-
cial risks that go with building a 
sports-related facility? The pro-
moters must back up their enthusi-
asm with hard facts. 
Some segments of the commu-
nity, for example, argue that the 
public should not provide tax dollars 
so that privately owned sports 
teams, the primary tenants of these 
arenas and stadiums, can make 
money from a publicly financed 
facility. Conversely, other segments 
of the community argue that an 
arena or stadium can mean addi-
tional business and improved morale 
to a community. The situation is the 
same, whether it concerns a relative-
ly small 3,000-5,000 seat arena that 
costs $2-$5 million in a city of 
40,000-50,000, or a large $100-$200 
million stadium with 60,000-80,000 
seats in a large metropolitan area. 
A common problem for public 
arenas or stadiums built in the past 
ten years is that the facility operates 
in the red if debt service —the cost 
of the initial borrowing for construc-
tion—is included. When facilities 
claim they are operating in the black, 
what many of them really mean is 
that they are covering operating 
costs. Excluding debt service is often 
considered acceptable, however, 
since so many facilities do not even 
cover operating costs. When older 
stadiums and arenas actually do 
operate in the black, it is usually 
because their original construction 
cost was much lower. In the early 
1960s, a large stadium's cost was in 
the range of $30 million to $50 
million. A comparable stadium today 
ranges from $80 million to $150 
million. 
So why do communities across 
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The Silver dome, Pontiac, Michigan. 
the country still debate whether or 
not to build arenas or stadiums? 
Probably the most common reason 
is the hope that the facility will bring 
more people and, therefore, more 
money into the community. In the 
case of larger cities, this can be 
money and people drawn back into 
the inner city. It is usually hard to 
prove, however, that an arena or 
stadium by itself can cause a com-
munity to be revitalized. Normally, 
several projects are needed. A more 
prevailing reason a stadium or arena 
gains support is focused on the pride 
of the community, as it is reflected in 
the support and allegiance to a 
professional sports team. Regardless 
of the reason, however, it is ultimate-
ly the community, through a referen-
dum or through a decision of elected 
officials, that should decide whether 
the benefits, economic and other-
wise, of a new stadium are worth the 
cost. 
Detroit: Two Game Plans 
Perhaps the easiest way to under-
stand the complex factors involved 
in borrowing money for an arena or 
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stadium is to take a look at the 
experiences of two communities in 
the Detroit metropolitan area. 
First, there is the $55 million, 
80,000-seat Pontiac Silverdome. Pon-
tiac is a suburban city of 90,000 
about 30 miles from downtown 
Detroit. The Pontiac Silverdome was 
constructed in 1973 to be the home 
of the National Football League's 
Detroit Lions, plus a site of other 
specia l events and commun i t y 
activities. The stadium was financed 
by $25 million in revenue bonds, 
$16 million in general obligation 
bonds passed by citizens in a special 
referendum, and $7 million in short-
term borrowings. 
Recently, the Pontiac Silverdome 
received unfavorable publicity —pre-
cipitated by losses of $3.2 million, 
after debt service, in the first three 
years of operation. Further, it is 
projected that the stadium will lose 
an additional $2.5 million in the 
1977-1978 fiscal year, in addition to 
being considerably more than the 
planned deficit of $1.8 million over 
these four years, this deficit of $5,7 
million, an obligation of the city, is 
very large when compared to the 
entire annual budget for Pontiac, 
which is only $25 million. 
An analysis of the deficit reveals 
that some of the largest expen-
ditures during the first three years 
were for improvements that helped 
to bring to Pontiac two additional 
sports teams —the National Basket-
ball Association's Detroit Pistons and 
a newly-formed soccer team, the 
Detroit Express. To accommodate 
the Pistons, for example, a smaller 
" m i n i - d o m e " of approx imate ly 
36,000 seats was created. The de-
sign of this mini-dome utilizes a 
corner of the stadium, with perma-
nent seating accounting for two of 
the four sides and temporary seating 
completing the remaining two sides. 
The mini-dome, which is separated 
from the remainder of the stadium 
by a removable curtain, will also be 
used to accommodate events with 
smaller attendance. 
Critics might ask, however, "Isn't 
this throwing good money after bad, 
since the city had apparently plan-
ned on losing money on the primary 
tenant, the Lions, and now it may 
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continue to run deficits with addi-
tional professional sports teams?" In 
response, two factors should be 
considered. First, most of the deficit 
in the first three years is the result of 
"one-time" expenses; the stadium 
does anticipate breaking even in the 
near future. < 
Second, and perhaps more impor-
tant, since its opening in September 
of 1975, until the end of the fiscal 
year, June 30, 1978, the Pontiac 
Silverdome has been visited by 
nearly 4 million paying customers. It 
has been estimated that these have 
generated close to $32 million in 
direct income for businesses and 
residents in the metropolitan Pontiac 
area. When considering a 2 1/2 times 
respending (multiplier) effect for this 
$32 million (i.e., assume a local 
restaurant is the recipient of one of 
these dollars and would in turn pay 
an employee who would in turn go 
to the local store or gas station and 
spend the money), the total eco-
nomic benefit to the Pontiac area is 
approximately $70 million. 
Another question that might be 
asked is whether or not the stadium 
money could have been spent on 
something else that would have had 
a better economic effect on the city. 
In the case of Pontiac, a study done 
at the same time the stadium was 
being comtemplated indicated that 
the growth from other revenue-
attracting industries —shopping cen-
ters, office complexes, and multiple 
family dwellings—was limited in 
Pontiac due to an abundance of 
such industries in the surrounding 
communities. The study concluded 
that economic expansion was avail-
able to the city only through addi-
tional manufacturing facilities. But it 
was felt by the community that 
Pontiac had enough manufacturing, 
that it would rather expand in other 
directions. Therefore, the stadium 
appeared to be a good option. 
Another factor that influenced the 
stadium decision was the pride of 
city residents. At that particular time, 
the city of Pontiac was receiving 
national attention because of prob-
lems associated with the busing of 
school children as a result of a 
Supreme Court decision. This issue 
had divided the citizens of Pontiac, 
and uniting behind the stadium 
project thus restored some of the 
pride that had been lost through the 
busing problem. 
The second example is that of the 
city of Detroit and its efforts in the 
stadium/arena area. The city is 
attempting to improve its image and 
its pride. The new Renaissance Cen-
ter in downtown Detroit reflects this. 
With three of its professional sports 
teams already moved to Pontiac, 
The Superdome, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
Detro i t was faced w i t h the 
possibility of losing its remaining 
professional baseball and hockey 
teams. 
To keep the Detroit Tigers, the city 
bought the existing baseball stadium 
for one dollar and began a multi-
year, $30 million renovation. At the 
same time, the Detroit Red Wings of 
the National Hockey League were 
contemplat ing a move to the 
suburbs and building their own 
arena. To counteract this, the city 
decided to construct a $25 million 
arena, and to offer a highly favorable 
financial package to the manage-
ment of the Red Wings. This pro-
posal, indeed, prompted their deci-
sion to stay in Detroit. 
What effect will all of this have on 
downtown Detroit? It is probably 
safe to say that it can contribute to 
the renaissance of the city and, 
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coupled with other developments, 
can improve the economy and 
morale of the citizens. This, in turn, 
might help promote a movement 
back toward downtown Detroit. But 
there are too many imponderables, 
beginning with a winning record for 
the Tigers and Red Wings, to enable 
one to predict the city's future with 
certainty. 
An example of a city which 
refused to support an arena is 
Columbus, Ohio, where a 20,000-
seat, $29.5 million arena was pro-
posed. In this case, a feasibility study 
indicated that total revenues would 
not cover operating expenses. The 
shortfall would have resulted in a 
cost to the average Columbus cit-
izen of approximately $1.50 per year, 
before considering any debt service. 
Asked to vote in a referendum, the 
citizens of Columbus rejected the 
building, at least for the time being. 
Presumably they wished to spend 
their money on something other 
than an arena. 
A Case Study in Optimism 
When a community does decide to 
build an arena or stadium, there are 
many pitfalls to be avoided. Too 
often a community decides that 
building a stadium will be good for 
the community, then constructs the 
facility without properly analyzing 
the facts. Often the supporters of 
the facility are so caught up in their 
own enthusiasm that they project 
potential events and revenue far 
greater than reality would indicate. 
Exactly this took place recently in 
a metropolitan area of approximately 
350,000 persons, whose major in-
dustry is tourism. The details are 
interesting. The city has two con-
trasting areas. The newer section is 
viable and growing. The original 
downtown section, however, has 
Texas Stadium, Irving. Texas. 
been in need of economic expan-
sion. 
In the past, several special interest 
groups for the overall community 
have suggested building a sports 
arena. Most recently a downtown 
businessmen's association commis-
sioned several feasibility studies; 
they determined that an 18,000-seat 
arena was needed and that, further-
more, it should be located in the 
downtown area. Yet despite exten-
sive campaigning for a new arena, 
there was little or no support for it in 
the local government. Therefore, the 
businessmen lobbied at the state 
legislature and succeeded in having a 
law passed that mandated construc-
tion of a sports arena adjacent to the 
central business district. It would be 
funded from hotel tax revenues 
previously earmarked for operating a 
convention center and promoting 
tourism. The cost of the arena was 
estimated at $26 million. 
Inside the visitors convention bu-
reau commission, there was a 
spirited debate, 5hould the commis-
sion reject the state law or comply 
with it? Several feasibility studies 
existed, but the commissioners de-
cided that prior to committing their 
organization to a heavy financial 
burden, they would retain an inde-
pendent third party to prepare a new 
feasibility study. The study would 
determine not only the financial and 
marketing feasibility of the project, 
but also a specific site for the arena. 
The decision for a new study was 
not welcomed, incidentally, by the 
special interest group that had lob-
bied for the law. Here is the story of 
that study. 
First, a profile of the general 
market area was compared to those 
of other areas of the country. The 
results were not encouraging. For 
example, this metropolitan area of 
350,000 persons was not in the top 
100 population centers in the nation. 
Moreover, 18,000-seat arenas were 
normally built in major metropolitan 
areas of at least 2 million people. 
Typical arenas of that size also had at 
least one, and often two, major 
professional sports teams, as well as 
a schedule of more than 200 events 
annually. In addition, most of these 
arenas lost money if debt service 
was included in total cost of the 
arena. 
Metropolitan areas of comparable 
size to this tourist community had 
arenas of approximately 8,000-
12,000 seats, and none of them 
served as the home of a professional 
sports team. Furthermore, only one 
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franchise in the National Basketball 
Association, the National Hockey 
League, or the World Hockey Asso-
ciation was in a city of less than one 
million in population. And that city, 
San Antonio, Texas, has a population 
of almost one million people and 
ranks as the 37th largest population 
center in the country. 
Based on a thorough analysis of 
area demographics, it was deter-
mined that a sports arena in this 
tourist community could attract 100 
to 110 events. To illustrate the 
optimism that is sometimes ex-
hibited when advocating construc-
Mile High Stadium, Denver, Colorado. 
tion of a stadium, we can compare 
this projection to that of a previous 
study conducted by the special 
interest group. The result is as 
follows: 
• A projection of 16 intercolle-
giate basketball games was more 
realistic than the previous study's 
21 games. Conversations with the 
league in which the local university 
team played indicated that the max-
imum number of home games al-
lowed (league and non-league) was 
17. The special interest group had 
predicted more games than were 
permissible under league rules. 
• No hockey games were pro-
jected for this market. The special 
interest group had projected 41 such 
events. According to hockey league 
officials in that region of the country, 
there were no teams interested in 
moving to this marketplace, and, 
furthermore, there were no people in 
this particular metropolitan area that 
had either expressed an interest or 
had contacted a league to sponsor a 
team. Furthermore, this area had had 
two professional hockey teams pre-
viously, and both had gone bankrupt 
due to lack of interest. 
• No volleyball games were pro-
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jected. The special interest group 
had projected 22 professional volley-
ball games. Further investigation into 
this projection indicated nothing 
more than talk about forming a 
professional league for cities of this 
size, and no communities had been 
identified. 
• The special interest study also 
indicated 12 intercollegiate sports 
activities to be held in the proposed 
arena. Interviews with the coaches 
of the various teams from the local 
university indicated that there was 
no interest or desire to move their 
games off the campus and into a 
large arena, 
• The special interest group pre-
dicted that there would be $125,000 
in daytime or non-event parking. But 
an investigation of the proposed site 
for the downtown arena revealed 
that there were no commercial or 
retail establishments adjacent to the 
property. Furthermore, there was free 
or inexpensive street and off-street 
parking available closer to the down-
town area. 
To determine the operating ex-
penses for a facility, one analyzes 
similar facilities in other localities 
and then adjusts the analysis accord-
ing to what is planned for the 
specific project. Since existing con-
vention personnel were to operate 
the new arena, accurate operating 
costs could be estimated. These 
pro ject ions ind icated personnel 
costs would be approximately twice 
what the special interest group had 
estimated. The special interest group 
study also projected fringe benefits 
to be an additional 12 percent of 
payroll costs, whereas the actual 
financial statements for the existing 
convention center indicated that a 
rate of 26 percent was more accu-
rate. From this analysis of operating 
costs, expenses were projected to 
be approximately $500,000 higher 
annually than the special interest 
group had foreseen. 
This analysis projected an operat-
ing loss before debt services of 
$350,000, vs. the special interest 
group projection of a $1,4 million 
profit. 
In addition to the operating loss, 
the debt service had to be added to 
determine the project's total cost to 
citizens. Utilizing somewhat different 
construction costs, but the same 
debt service assumptions used in 
the former study, the project was 
forecast to lose approximately $2 
million per year This compared to 
the previous study's projection of a 
$700,000 annual loss. 
In response, the special interest 
group hired another consultant to 
refute the new study's statistics and 
projections. This consultant stated 
that projections of only 100 to 110 
events were unreasonable. He based 
his o w n p r o j e c t i o n s on the 
Philadelphia Spectrum, the Los An-
geles Forum, and the Washington, 
D.C. Capitol Centre, all of which 
were holding 250 to 300 events 
annually. Such a comparison was not 
valid, however, since these arenas 
serve metropolitan areas of approxi-
mately 3 to 7 million people, not an 
area of 350,000. In addition, each of 
the three facilities above housed two 
professional sports teams, thereby 
providing about 80 to 85 of the total 
events. 
Although it may appear that the 
special interest group was purposely 
using incorrect figures, this was not 
the case. They really did believe 
their numbers, largely due to their 
enthusiasm for the project. What of 
the commission? After considering 
the facts, the commission accepted 
its own study and tabled consider-
ation of the facility until a new 
source of funds could be identified 
to support the $2 million annual 
deficit. 
Post-Came Follow-Up 
During the past ten years, the 
question of whether public money 
should be spent to construct an 
arena or stadium has been raised 
again and again. If there is a trend 
today, it is that communities are less 
willing to run a financial risk on 
sports-related facilities. They will 
support only projects for which a 
need is obvious. 
Thus, when a study is conducted 
to determine whether or not an 
arena or stadium makes sense to a 
community, care must be taken that 
all economic factors are realistically 
evaluated. The community or its 
elected representatives can then 
make the decision. Should a decision 
be made to build a facility, both the 
financing and the construction must 
be carefully monitored, the initial 
operation carefully planned, and, 
when in operation, the arena or 
stadium must be run as is any private 
business. 
"We have to meet payrolls, as 
does any other business," says Abe 
Pollin, who owns and operates the 
Capitol Centre in Washington, D.C. , 
at a net profit. "We have to pay 
taxes, as any other business. We 
have to pay rent. We have to meet all 
our bills. We can't look to the 
taxpayer to bail us out. The fact is 
that public stadiums and centers are 
not run with the same intensity, the 
same acumen as they are when you 
have to make a financial go of it." 
But this is a challenge that com-
munities who plan, build, and oper-
ate stadiums can meet—if they 
obtain the correct information be-
forehand and then implement their 
plan faithfully. a 
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